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The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
This report was prepared by the Centre for International Cooperation and Security based 
in Bradford University’s Department of Peace Studies. It is part of a wider project – the 
Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) – which is being funded by the UK 
government’s Department for International Development (DFID).  
 
The AVPI is made up of four projects: 
1) A Briefing Papers series on armed violence and poverty reduction measures in the 
areas of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration), SSR (Security Sector 
Reform), Conflict Assessment, and Rural Livelihoods. 
2) An assessment of the impact of small arms projects on arms availability and poverty. 
3) A research project which documents and analyses the circumstances in and processes 
by which armed violence exacerbates poverty and development. 
4) A research project which documented the impact of arms transfers on poverty and 
development. 
 
All of these reports can be downloaded from www.bradford.ac.uk/cics. 
 
This initiative, which expanded beyond DFID to involve a number of donor agencies and 
NGOs, grew out of a concern to understand the problems created by arms availability and 
their violent use, and of the ways in which measures to reduce armed violence can be 
integrated into poverty reduction work at both policy and programme level. This briefing 
aims to clarify and highlight ways in which the spread, possession and (mis)use of SALW 
and related armed violence issues can be relevant in conflict assessments, and how they 
can be integrated better within such assessments. The authors would like to thank Paul 
Eavis for comments made on an earlier draft. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The flows, availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) associated 
with armed violence and insecurity, are clearly potentially important factors in war-torn 
and conflict-prone countries. It therefore follows that they need to be properly taken into 
account in conflict assessments conducted by development agencies to inform their 
country and regional strategies, with the aim of ensuring policies and programmes are 
‘conflict sensitive’.  
 
In practice to date, however, SALW have rarely been highlighted as a substantial issue in 
conflict assessments, nor one on which donors can subsequently develop programming 
responses as part of holistic conflict reduction strategies.  One reason for this oversight is 
that research into SALW as a specific factor in conflict dynamics and impacts is 
relatively new, particularly in terms of the connections between SALW flows, availability 
and misuse in the development context. As such, the significance of SALW and other 
arms is often underestimated or too narrowly considered in conflict assessment 
frameworks and practice. Where they are considered, they are often treated as an 
‘exogenous’ factor: as a symptom rather than part of the complex connections driving 
conflict dynamics, developmental impacts, and presenting conflict reduction 
opportunities. This has been largely true for DFID, which has developed its own 
guidelines for such conflict assessments, as described in Conducting Conflict 
Assessments: Guidance Notes (DFID, 2002). The implication is that conflict assessments 
are missing a potentially important element in their analyses, with repercussions for the 
effectiveness of programming responses of development agencies and their partners.  
 
This briefing aims to clarify and highlight ways in which the spread, possession and 
(mis)use of SALW and related armed violence issues can be relevant in conflict 
assessments, and how they can be integrated better within such assessments. It employs 
the conflict assessment framework set out in DFID’s conflict assessment guidelines, and 
thus aims particularly to assist people who may be: commissioning and developing terms 
of reference for a specific assessment; undertaking a desk-based and/or field assessment; 
and those taking forward the analysis to the development of programming responses. 
There already exists the potential for SALW issues to be addressed within DFID’s 
existing conflict assessment guidelines, and thus this paper does not suggest that DFID’s 
methodology has to change but rather ‘opened-up’ to include SALW more fully within 
their analyses and the strategies they generate.  
 
Most of the issues raised have generic relevance, and thus the briefing may also be of 
wider sectoral or international use to those considering sector-specific assessments and 
the use of other analytical frameworks where armed violence issues arise (such as in 
poverty and social impact assessment; sustainable livelihoods analysis; drivers of change; 
and needs assessments in various contexts, including post-conflict environments).  
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2. SALW and conflict 
 
It is estimated that there are some 640 million SALW in existence. Most of these are in 
official military, police or other state security agencies, but vast quantities are also 
legitimately held by civilians. Many millions more are held by criminals and armed 
militias. SALW are by far the primary instrument of armed violence in war, and 
particularly in the complex civil wars that have devastated many developing and 
transitional countries in recent years. Most rebel groups fighting against states, many 
state forces, and many militias in inter-communal conflict, are almost exclusively armed 
with SALW. These arms are closely associated with the increased proportion (between 30 
– 90%) of civilian deaths in wars since 1990.1  
 
SALW do not ‘cause’ armed conflicts, which typically arise from a complex and dynamic 
set of factors, as emphasised in DFID’s conflict assessment guidelines. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that there are strong links between SALW flows, availability and misuse and the 
risks and forms of violent conflict. Access to SALW is often a key factor in the 
escalation, intensity, pattern, spread and duration of conflicts. The wide availability of 
SALW makes civil wars, inter-communal violence, and armed crime more feasible and 
more destructive. The armed violence and insecurity associated with SALW proliferation 
obstructs development and humanitarian efforts, and thus contributes to factors 
underlying conflicts. It also hinders post-conflict peace building and reconstruction, 
contributing to the risk of recurrent violence and the costs of rising armed crime 
commonly experienced in post-conflict societies.  
 
Moreover, efforts to address SALW problems are part of the wide range of measures 
available to contribute to conflict prevention and reduction. Not only can efforts to 
address SALW be important in their own right, but they can also have powerful symbolic 
or confidence-building value. For example, weapons hand-in and destruction programmes 
have contributed substantially to conflict prevention and peace-building in numerous 
conflict-prone or post-conflict countries, from El Salvador and Mali to Cambodia. SALW 
can have complex connections with many aspects of development agencies’ agendas. As 
such, it can not only be addressed through SALW-specific projects or programmes, or as 
an integrated component of ‘direct’ conflict prevention or peace-building programmes, 
but also through mainstreaming an understanding of SALW issues in the design of 
conflict-sensitive development programmes. 
 
Conflict assessments typically include three key elements: conflict analysis; analysis of 
responses, and the development of strategies and options (for example, these are the main 
sections of DFID guidance notes on conflict assessments). This briefing discusses the 
relevance of SALW issues for each of these elements in turn. The aim is not to suggest 
that SALW issues are always a critical factor in conflict-prone societies: this is a matter 
for specific investigation and analysis in each case. Rather it is to clarify the ways in 
which SALW issues may be relevant and important, particularly in the complex, multi-
                                                 
1 ICRC, Arms Availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict, (Geneva, ICRC, 1999). 
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levelled and interlocking patterns of tension and conflicts in countries in which 
development agencies often operate. 
 
3. SALW and conflict analysis 
 
DFID’s guidance notes on conflict assessments (Section 1) suggest that conflict analyses 
may be approached through three dimensions: historical/structural factors contributing to 
conflict (conflict structures); conflict actors; and conflict dynamics.  SALW issues are 
relevant to each of these dimensions in a multiplicity of ways, depending (for example) 
upon the ‘phase’ of the conflict in the country/region concerned. 
 
3.1 Structures (historical/structural factors underlying conflicts) 
 
The DFID Guidance Notes already identify ‘the proliferation of light weapons’ as a 
security factor amongst its illustrative list of sources of tension and conflict (Table 2, 
p12). As noted above, excessive or uncontrolled availability, flow and misuse of SALW 
can escalate, intensify, spread and extend the duration of armed conflicts. Their easy 
availability can turn endemic low-level social violence and crime into a major challenge 
to the state’s monopoly over violence that is seen to require an armed response, as well as 
significantly raising the numbers and degree to which vulnerable people are affected by 
armed violence and insecurity.  
 
Arms flows and accumulations can have an overall structural impact by making it more 
feasible for numerous interest groups to try to use violence to resolve conflicts in their 
favour. Arms flows constitute and facilitate relationships amongst armed groups and 
suppliers that can entangle a country in neighbouring conflicts from which it might 
otherwise be able to distance itself. In insecure countries, simply the visibility of arms or 
the sound of gunshots (even from hunters) can sap public confidence and generate fear 
and instability.  
 
However, SALW can have much wider significance than as a single factor to be taken 
into account within the ‘security’ dimension of a given context. The spread, availability 
and misuse of such weapons can further contribute to many of the other long-term factors 
underlying conflict, as well as the compounding of their impacts on poverty.  Further 
analysis can identify the ways in which SALW are intimately connected with other 
aspects of the security context, and with the underlying political, economic and social 
characteristics of the conflict: 
 
3.1.1 Security  
The availability, spread and misuse of SALW contributes to key security factors 
underlying conflict. For example, it can be a cause as well as a symptom of: limited reach 
and poor control of military, police and other security forces; human rights abuses from 
security forces and other armed groups; poorly controlled borders; and the potency of 
non-state militias, vigilantes and other armed groups.  
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For instance, the wide availability of AK-47 and other automatic assault rifles across 
much of sub-Saharan Africa has made it harder for relatively poorly resourced police or 
border guards or traditional authorities to assert their authority over borders, criminals, 
bandits or militias, and has greatly exacerbated the scale of abuses that can readily be 
perpetrated on vulnerable people. SALW may be legally or illicitly supplied by states and 
others to governments or armed groups in support of strategic security interests, and arms 
flows across borders can produce regional conflict ‘systems’. 
 
3.1.2 Politics  
SALW and the risks of armed violence contribute to key political factors underlying 
conflict. High levels of armed crime and violence in a society can undermine respect for 
law and government, limit the reach of government, discourage participation amongst 
relatively vulnerable sectors of society (including women and the poor) and provide the 
context for vigilantism. The political exploitation of ethnic, religious and other 
differences has sometimes included the distribution of SALW to allied groups, with wide 
and enduring consequences. Ready availability of arms tends to increase the risks of 
violence and intimidation in elections. Wide access to highly lethal SALW can help to 
overwhelm the capacity of existing conflict management and dispute resolution systems.  
 
3.1.3 Economy  
The economy can be severely affected by the availability and use of SALW. Fears of 
armed violence tend to disrupt or constrain much economic or developmental activity – 
including mobility and trade, as well as access to education and health care – 
undermining both rural and urban livelihoods (see for example, the Armed Violence and 
Rural Livelihoods Briefing Paper in this series). It distorts patterns of economic 
development, and often contributes to economic marginalisation and under-investment in 
already deprived areas – exacerbating social division and economic disparities.  It deters 
foreign investment, tourism and other key areas for economic development. These 
impacts can help aggravate underlying economic sources of tension and conflict. 
 
The growth of black and parallel economies and the development and maintenance of 
‘war economies’ are intimately linked with the relative empowerment of armed groups 
associated with SALW proliferation. For example, the links between the drug trade and 
the spread of weapons and violence was highlighted in DFID’s conflict assessment in the 
Ferghana Valley of Kyrgyzstan. In insecure or conflict environments, SALW may be a 
crucial part of the war economy, facilitating and enforcing extortion and corruption, as 
well as feeding into widening insecurity through ‘defensive’ weapons ownership to 
protect livelihoods. 
 
3.1.4 Social  
In relation to social sources of tension, SALW proliferation can reinforce processes of 
social exclusion and the general degeneration of social capital. The legacy of unresolved 
ethnic or political conflicts may be heightened by an abundance of SALW that increases 
violence and casualties associated with social friction. Migrants and displaced peoples 
can not only be driven by SALW-related violence, but used in SALW flows, particularly 
in cross-border trafficking. The emergence of cultures of violence may become entwined 
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with gun cultures, increasing the human costs and making the violence harder to manage 
overall. The spread of SALW to disenfranchised youth and “warrior” groups may further 
reinforce cultures of violence at the expense of customary governance and conflict 
management systems.   
 
In summary, in conflict-prone countries it is often a mistake to readily assume, as many 
still do in the development community, that SALW issues are simply a symptom rather 
than a source of tension and conflict. In the complex and dynamic processes that are 
characteristic of conflict-prone countries, supposed ‘symptoms’ and ‘underlying tensions’ 
become intimately entwined over time. SALW often feature, either explicitly or 
implicitly, in perceptions of power and insecurity, and conflict analyses need to be alert 
to this possibility.   
 
3.2 Conflict actors 
 
Alongside examinations of historical or structural factors, DFID and other conflict 
assessments require an analysis of the interests, relations, capacities, agendas, and 
incentives of the actors who influence or are affected by conflict. SALW availability can 
affect all of these factors.  
 
Access to SALW, including ammunition and explosives, is a critical attribute for actors in 
countries at risk or suffering from armed conflict. It is an important determinant of their 
capacity to influence conflict.  Moreover, SALW availability and flow can substantially 
change the capacities of some actors to influence events – enhancing the capacities of 
certain armed groups, while disempowering others. Even a relatively small and unpopular 
group can impact significantly in a conflict if it is well armed and willing to use violence.  
 
SALW are particularly associated with security forces, arms brokers, warlords, black 
market dealers, trafficking networks and other criminal organisations, militias and civil 
defence forces, and rebel groups. Flows of arms to conflict areas are often facilitated by 
one or more neighbouring state, either as an instrument of policy by at least some section 
of the government or through neglect or corruption. SALW availability may also be 
connected with the strategic and political objectives of wider international actors who, 
through arms transfers or sanctions (and their enforcement) can influence the interests or 
capacities of state and non-state parties. Possession and use of substantial amounts of 
arms is often likely to be sufficient for an actor to warrant inclusion as a key conflict 
actor in the analysis.   
 
Furthermore, as conflicts develop, SALW flows can change incentive structures, and thus 
the peace agendas of some actors.  The availability of SALW may encourage some to 
believe that they can achieve their goals through violence, thereby reducing interest in 
peaceful strategies. Peace agendas may also be informed by other interests related to 
SALW.  For instance, access to SALW is often vital to some protagonists for the 
maintenance and protection of their exploitation of natural resources and the protection of 
illicit trafficking routes.  Similarly SALW may be a key element of the internal power 
structures of elites within conflict factions – allowing leaders to mobilise and equip 
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forces, and to maintain the coherence of the group.  For instance, in some conflicts rebel 
groups have tended to fragment when leaders were unable to secure access to supplies of 
arms and ammunition.   
 
As conflicts come to an end, it is now widely recognised that special measures are needed 
to support the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants. 
Otherwise there is a risk that their familiarity with and access to arms will encourage 
them to turn to banditry or crime to sustain themselves. In this context, analyses of the 
incentives required for particular groups (individual members and their leaders) to turn to 
peace are particularly critical. Experience shows that such measures and incentives can be 
critical at all phases of a conflict, and also amongst all sections of society with access to 
arms as well as formal ‘ex-combatants’.  
 
Box 1: SALW and conflict scenarios in Uganda 
 
In the UK’s strategic conflict assessment for Uganda, SALW and related arms violence 
issues were key to the examination of conflict scenarios in the north of the country.  For 
instance one of the key possible indicators for intensified and prolonged conflict was 
evidence that the Government of Sudan was backing the Lords Resistance Army, 
including through the provision of SALW.  Regional support for rebel groups, or one of 
rival groups, through the supply of SALW, or the facilitation of supplies by others, is 
often a critical element in the prolongation and intensification of civil wars.  However, 
although some form of weapons decommissioning was regarded as being a potential 
feature of a peace process, other aspects of SALW issues were not systematically 
included either as indicators of potential conflict scenarios or as programming options.  
 
Furthermore, processes of arming and disarming the Karamoja and other tribal groups 
have become a major feature in northern Uganda. Unfortunately, processes aimed at 
controlling arms availability have often been sporadic and uncoordinated, nationally and 
between Kenya and other neighbours, thus changing power relations between tribal 
groups and sometimes exacerbating rather than reducing armed violence. 
 
This box draws on table three of DFID, “Conducting Conflict Assessment: Guidance Notes”, London 
DFID. 
 
3.3 Dynamics and stages 
 
Based on the analysis of structures and conflict actors, a conflict analysis should examine 
long-term trends and short-term triggers for conflict, in order to understand the dynamics 
of the conflict and the risks of outbreak or escalation of armed violence (see, for example, 
DFID Guidance Notes, section 1.3). The dynamics of SALW availability, flow and 
misuse can be critical in the overall dynamics of conflict because, as outlined above, it 
can profoundly affect all three of the key factors for escalating conflict identified in 
DFID’s guidance notes: 
 The structural vulnerability to violent conflict;  
 Opportunities for key conflict actors to benefit from instability and violence;  
 A society’s capacity to manage or contain conflict.  
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Even quite modest flows of assault rifles can dramatically change power relations 
between key groups, and change perceived interests and incentives for peace or war. 
Moreover, the spread of weapons can be particularly hard to reverse, contributing to a 
ratcheting-up or exacerbation of the conflict dynamic. For example, as tensions rise, 
authorities in countries such as Peru, Guatemala, Nepal, Mozambique and Sierra Leone 
have been tempted to distribute arms to civil defence forces or to their ethnic or political 
allies, often with irreversible and damaging consequences, including loss of control.  
 
Because of the importance of SALW availability and flows in the dynamics of many 
conflicts, and also the significance of such flows as an indicator of the expectations and 
intentions of key conflict actors, there have been proposals to monitor them for the 
purposes of early warning of conflict. Flows of arms to key conflict actors in the former 
Yugoslavia, DRC or the Mano River countries of West Africa, for example, appear to 
have been important indicators.  
 
SALW can also be particularly relevant to processes that trigger conflict. Competitive 
arming can lead to mini arms races and security dilemmas amongst conflict parties, with 
consequent incentives for excessive arms accumulation or pre-emption. Moreover, the 
high lethality of many widely available SALW, such as automatic weapons, increases the 
risk that a local incident escalates into wider conflict. Where casualties may previously 
have been limited to a few injuries, use of assault rifles can result in dozens of deaths and 
injuries in a few minutes.  
 
Access to SALW can enable even small and unpopular groups to be effective ‘spoilers’ to 
disrupt efforts to prevent or end violent conflict. On the other hand, SALW reduction and 
control measures can provide particularly potent symbols of a desire by key conflict 
actors to opt for peace and confidence building. Weapons hand-in or transparency can be 
much more persuasive than mere declarations of good intentions.  
 
4. SALW and international responses 
 
The second stage of a strategic conflict assessment is to examine the role of external 
development and other international engagement, and their inter-actions with conflict and 
conflict prevention processes. According to the specific context, outside countries 
(including development agencies such as DFID) may to some degree be seen as interested 
parties in a conflict. As such, elements of this section may also feed into conflict analysis 
under the mapping of the interests and policies of international actors.   
 
The role of international actors relevant to SALW availability, such as arms exporter 
countries, arms brokers and illicit traffickers, should already be included in the conflict 
analysis.  Military, trade and diplomatic interests can sometimes lead to the supply or 
denial of SALW as an instrument. The legitimate transfer of SALW can contribute to 
state military and policing capacity during conflict; while illicit transfers from and 
through regional states can affect rebel military capacities.  Legitimate arms transfers can 
be diverted en-route; or be lost due to poor stockpile security and theft. However, many 
conflicts feature human rights abuses by state actors. The fact that SALW have a 
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relatively long ‘shelf-life’ means that they may well have been obtained through a 
legitimate arms transfer to legitimate state forces, but end up being used by a repressive 
regime against its own population.  
 
The DFID Guidance Notes highlight the different approaches of donors to conflict – the 
analysis of international responses may point to the fact that specific donors are working 
on SALW directly or indirectly, or intentionally or inadvertently avoiding them in their 
strategies and programmes. This can highlight potential partners for follow-up responses 
to the conflict assessment, as well as identifying which other donors it may be useful to 
influence to take SALW more actively into account. 
 
Box 2: Sri Lanka conflict assessment:  
responses and options 
 
A conflict assessment of Sri Lanka criticised the provision of different types of aid to 
different regions, thereby exacerbating divisions.  Arms issues were also raised in this 
assessment, but largely as a footnote: for instance reference was made to the significance 
of arms procurement as “the most significant vested interest related to the conflict in 
financial terms” and it was noted that “The extent of involvement of foreign arms dealers, 
their proximity to the army, and the inclination of some sections of the defence 
establishment to benefit from dollar-based transactions are a cause for concern.”* In 
addition to these economic structures of conflict, other arms-related issues, such as the 
transnational criminal networks of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – 
including gunrunning, the leakage of arms from the military to disaffected youth, and the 
military significance of LTTE captures of arms, contributed to instability.  However, 
specific options for tackling arms problems, and many other issues related to the 
availability, flow and misuse of arms in the Sri Lankan conflict, are absent from the 
evaluation of international responses and possible donor strategies and options. It is also 
noteworthy that arms and armed conflict issues are not prominent in the poverty 
reduction strategy paper for Sri Lanka. While this may reflect some real policy restraints, 
it also may highlight missed opportunities.  
 
*Reference: Jonathan  Goodhand, “Conflict Assessments: Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka”, 
London, Centre for Defence Studies, 2001.  
 
Development agencies may directly or indirectly affect SALW availability, flow and 
misuse, and thus conflict dynamics. This is relevant not only for assessing responses by 
development actors but also their capacities to respond. Possible direct effects include 
support for capacity building, reform, accountability and control of police, border guards, 
military, judiciary, and so on, through Governance, Safety, Security and Access to Justice 
(SSAJ) or Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes (see the Armed Violence and 
Governance Briefing Paper in this series). The UK and many other donors provide direct 
support for programmes to control and reduce SALW – such as weapons collection and 
destruction; laws and regulations on trade and civilian possession, or arms stockpile 
security - thereby affecting some of the structures of conflict. After conflicts, 
programmes for demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration of ex-combatants should 
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have a direct affect on arms availability as well as conflict risks (see the Armed Violence 
and DDR Briefing Paper in this series). 
 
More widely (intended or unintended) linkages between humanitarian and development 
interventions and SALW accumulations or misuse can be significant. For example, 
experience has shown that, unless specific controls are in place, programmes for refugees 
and displaced people can be misused by armed groups to facilitate arms flows and abuse. 
All development aid interventions (for example, as emphasised in section 2.3 of the DFID 
Guidance Notes) need to be conflict sensitive if they are to contribute to conflict 
prevention and avoid negative impacts. Economic liberalisation, administrative reform, 
decentralisation, and downsizing police and security expenditures can have unintended 
impacts on controls of SALW and opportunities for armed groups.  
 
5. Developing strategies and options 
 
The final stage of a conflict assessment is to identify strategies and options for conflict 
reduction. Where SALW issues have been identified as important in the analyses of the 
conflict and of international and developmental responses, it would be expected that they 
are prominent in the development of strategies and options.  
 
In practice, SALW and armed violence issues still often receive inadequate attention at 
this stage of conflict assessments even where they are prominent in the earlier stages. The 
main reasons for this include:  
 Lack of familiarity in development organisations with the range of opportunities for 
supporting SALW reduction and control in different contexts (‘pre-conflict’, during 
conflict, and ‘post-conflict’).  
 Lack of awareness of ways in which measures to address SALW and armed violence 
issues can usefully be linked or integrated with other areas of development 
programming, to the overall benefit of the programme and its wider contribution to 
conflict reduction. 
 Lack of institutional capacity to design and implement programmes engaging with 
armed violence and SALW issues, and low awareness of sources of assistance. 
 Lingering perceptions that SALW and armed violence issues are unduly ‘technical’, 
risky, or particularly politically sensitive, or that they are merely symptoms of 
conflict that are not worthy of attention in their own right (often linked to lack of 
familiarity with opportunities for engaging).   
 
These are significant obstacles. But there is now sufficient experience with addressing 
SALW and armed violence issues in donor programmes to enable their inclusion, where 
appropriate, in both individual donor strategies and in the development of common donor 
approaches to conflict-prone countries.    
 
5.1 Individual donor strategies 
  
The conflict assessment guidelines include a number of sector-specific interventions that 
can be developed as new initiatives within individual donor strategies.  These include 
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specific SALW programmes – such as proliferation controls, laws and regulations, 
weapons collection and destruction, stockpile security, and post-conflict disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Measures to address SALW have proved 
to be surprisingly good entry points for engagement with local communities, armed 
groups, and security sector reform. Far from being highly sensitive, a focus on the control 
of arms can often help to generate mobilisation and cooperation amongst otherwise 
divided communities, and for starting an engagement between communities, the police, 
military and armed groups. SALW can be addressed through civil society/NGO capacity-
building programmes aimed at supporting the role of the public in conflict resolution and 
dialogue, such as human rights-focused organisations and those which seek to bring 
traditional conflict resolution and justice to bear on conflict protagonists and in 
reconciliation. 
 
In many cases, established development programmes can usefully be developed to 
contribute to SALW reduction and control to mutual benefit.  For instance, local 
community development projects can include community incentive-based weapons 
collections, and benefit from the community mobilisation and cooperation these can 
generate. Reforms of public administration and law can include issues related to SALW 
regulations (civilian possession, trading), security sector reform should include issues of 
stockpile security to reduce proliferation, and police reform can contribute to reduced 
demand for SALW.  (See other briefings in this series).   
 
Conflict assessments can be used to generate useful early warning indicators of conflict 
trends, as well as potential triggers of future conflict escalation (such as sudden large-sale 
acquisitions of SALW), or specific opportunities which make the time ripe for active 
engagement in conflict approaches (such as a critical mass of civil society calling for 
weapons control or disarmament). Indicators can also be used to monitor and evaluate the 
effectiveness of SALW programmes. 
 
5.2 Common donor approaches 
 
The DFID conflict assessment guidelines emphasise the need for common donor 
approaches and for “joined-up” analysis as a prerequisite for the development of coherent 
responses.  It also emphasises the need to develop comprehensive approaches which link 
development assistance to other policy instruments.  Although there are major challenges 
to developing common donor approaches to conflict, and to associated SALW issues, 
there are some frameworks in place that may contribute towards this.   
 
Several global and regional frameworks exist with the potential for developing common 
donor approaches to SALW, including the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, and 
regional agreements in Southern Africa, East Africa and the Horn of Africa; West Africa; 
OAS member states and elsewhere. They provide a common normative basis for 
cooperation amongst recipient countries and between them and providers of development 
aid. In several issue areas, including those outlined above, best practice guidelines and 
shared commitments are now quite well-developed internationally, with stated 
commitments to coordinated and coherent programmes.  
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In practice, the same problems of donor cooperation, coordination and coherence exist in 
programmes to address SALW and armed violence as they do in other areas of 
development assistance. It is important to ensure systems for regular information 
exchange and consultation at least, and to build the capacity of the recipient countries to 
coordinate international assistance according to their priorities and needs. In relation to 
SALW, DFID, UNDP and other donors are actively supporting the development of 
comprehensive SALW national action programmes and national coordination capacity in 
several countries, including Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. Since conflict dynamics 
depend on complex interactions across a range of security, economic, political and social 
areas, co-ordination and coherence is particularly important.  
 
Thus arms transfer controls by supplier or transit countries are very relevant here. Where 
there is a multilateral arms embargo or other related sanctions, patterns of international 
implementation or circumvention need to be taken into account. Even in the absence of 
an embargo, the UK and other arms suppliers have adopted criteria for licensing arms 
transfers aimed at limiting risks of negative impacts on conflict, security, human rights 
and development. As a member of the EU, OSCE and Wassenaar export control 
arrangements, the UK has a capacity to influence arms transfer controls in other supplier 
countries as well as a responsibility to ensure appropriate restraint. DFID is part of the 
UK’s arms export control process, and thus issues raised in its conflict assessments can 
be directly fed in to decision-making. A conflict assessment may provide the basis for 
denying an application for an official license for an arms transfer since it would 
undermine the Government’s conflict prevention and development objectives. The 
assessment may also highlight more appropriate material assistance to the state security 
sector, accompanied by other capacity-building such as human rights training and 
tackling impunity. Controls on SALW can thus provide a hook for broadening 
engagement into these associated areas. A conflict assessment may also provide the basis 
for the commissioning Government to influence other arms-supplying states to change 
their practices. 
 
6. Conclusions and recommendations  
 
Issues relating to the availability, flow and misuse of SALW are potentially important in 
every key aspect of conflict assessments – conflict analysis; assessments of international 
responses; and development of strategies and options. This is recognised, for example, in 
DFID’s conflict assessments guidance. But, in practice, the role that SALW play in 
conflict, their developmental impacts and the potential for strategies and options to 
address SALW issues are commonly neglected.  
 
This briefing has highlighted ways in which SALW and related armed violence issues 
may be relevant in each aspect of a conflict assessment, in order to help those conducting 
such assessments to take then appropriately into account. It has shown that SALW 
potentially play a part in all dimensions of a conflict, rather than being simply a stand-
alone issue, and as such, that they may be addressed throughout response strategies and 
programme design, as well as through SALW-specific programmes.  
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In some cases, investigation may demonstrate that SALW issues are relatively marginal. 
There is no implication that they are always important in conflict-prone countries. 
However, it seems clear from experience that they are often important, and moreover that 
addressing SALW issues can provide useful entry points for wider engagements with 
communities, governments and security sector agencies at the same time as reducing the 
human cost of SALW violence. 
 
It is specifically recommended that guidance on SALW and conflict assessments, such as 
this briefing paper, be circulated and made available to those staff in DFID and the UK 
government, as well as in other governments, development agencies or multilateral 
organisations, that are involved in: advising on conflict issues; commissioning or 
conducting a conflict assessment; or developing or coordinating response strategies and 
programmes. Experience shows that they are unlikely to be fully aware of all the issues 
raised here. A number of further sources of information, including other briefing papers 
in this series, are listed at the end of this document. Concerned staff can seek further 
support and more detailed best practice guidance from these sources. 
 
 
Further sources of information and support 
 
If you wish to consult further about the ways in which SALW and armed violence issues 
can be taken into account in conflict assessments with which you are concerned, contact 
the SALW team at CHAD: 
 
Richard Haviland, SALW Programme Manager 
R-Haviland@dfid.gov.uk
Tel: +0044 (0)20 7023 0868 
 
Kate Joseph, Senior Non-Proliferation Consultant  
K-Joseph@dfid.gov.uk
Tel: +44 (0)20 7023 0359  
 
Further reading 
 
Armed violence and Poverty Initiative papers (Bradford University/DFID, at 
www.brad.ac.uk/cics/) 
 
Other papers in this Briefing Paper Series: 
• Armed Violence, Governance, Security Sector Reform, and Safety Security and Access 
to Justice 
• Armed Violence and Rural Livelihoods 
• Armed Violence in the Post-Conflict Transition: DDR and Small Arms and Light 
Weapons Reduction Initiatives 
• See also: The impact of armed violence on poverty and development: synthesis report 
 
Other reading 
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DFID, Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes, (London, DFID, 2002) 
Available at:  http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf  
 
DFID, Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence: Recommendations from a Wilton 
Park Workshop: 14 – 16 April 2003, (London, DFID, 2003).  
Available at:  http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/tacklingpovredviolence.pdf 
 
Goodhand, Jonathan, Conflict Assessments: Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 
(London, Centre for Defence Studies, 2001).   
Available at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflictassessmentsrilanka.pdf 
 
Goodhand, Jonathan, Conflict Assessments: A synthesis report: Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Nepal and Sri Lanka, (London, Centre for Defence Studies, 2001).   
Available at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflictassessmentsynthesis.pdf 
 
Vaux, Tony, & Goodhand, Jonathan, Conflict Assessments: Disturbing connections: aid 
and conflict in Kyrgyzstan, (London, Centre for Defence Studies, 2001).   
Available at: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflictassessmentkyrgyzstan.pdf 
 
Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied, (Oxford, OUP, 
2003).   
Available at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb_2003.htm 
 
 
Useful websites 
 
UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool SALW Strategy: 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Pa
ge&cid=1041606161328 
 
Small Arms Survey: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 
 
Saferworld: http://www.saferworld.org.uk 
 
International Alert: http://www.international-alert.org 
 
Human Rights Watch Arms Project:  http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=arms 
 
IANSA: http://www.iansa.org 
 
Centre for International Co-operation and Security, University of Bradford: 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/peace/cics 
 
UN Department for Disarmament Affairs Conventional Arms Branch: 
http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cab/salw.html 
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